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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Tucson Unified School District (“TUSD”) is Arizona’s second largest public 
school district. Latinos comprise over 60 percent of the student population, and 
each school year they become a larger percentage of TUSD’s student population. 
Historically, Mexican American students attending TUSD have performed poorly, 
experiencing excessive failure and drop-out rates. Approximately 50 percent of 
Mexican American 8
th
 graders will drop out before graduation. 
In an effort to reverse these disastrous results, TUSD developed the Mexican 
American Studies (“MAS”) Program, an innovative curriculum based upon 
restorative educational practices. The intent was to move away from a deficit 
viewpoint, i.e., that the students, their families, and neighborhoods were 
“defective” and thus destined to fail in school.  
MAS worked. Students with years of poor performance found themselves 
engaged in their education and striving to graduate and even go on to college. At 
the core of MAS was the fundamental belief that every student and her or his 
family has worth and is capable of moving forward and achieving success.  
The promise of MAS was taken away by elected officials who did not 
understand the program, were threatened by the curriculum, and were openly 
fearful of Arizona’s growing Mexican and Mexican American population. Their 
response was A.R.S. § 15-112, a vague and overbroad state law based upon racial 
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bias and fears that gave the Arizona State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
the Arizona State Board of Education arbitrary and discretionary enforcement 
power. Essentially, the law allowed state officials to force assimilation into a rigid 
orthodoxy that returned every TUSD Mexican American student to the same 
morass that existed before MAS.  
MAS may be innovative, creative, and challenging, but it is based upon a 
sound educational strategy intended to stop the cycle of failure too many Mexican 
American students experience in their education. Successful students who are 
critical thinkers should never be feared, even if they are Mexican American. 
COUNTER STATEMENT REGARDING FACTS
1
 
 
In a lengthy introduction that precedes their statement of facts, Defendants 
relate in detail then State Superintendent Tom Horne’s 2010 Finding (“Horne 
Finding”) against TUSD and MAS. Appellees’ Principal and Response Brief 
(“Appellees’ Br.”) at 1-6. The Horne Finding, ER10 2183-92, dated two days 
before the January 1, 2011, effective date of A.R.S. §15-112, was found by the 
district court to involve retroactive application of the statute and to contain 
“problematic assumptions and implicit biases.” ER1 28-29. And in a section styled 
“Testimony of Witnesses,” the Horne Finding asserts as truth unsworn, mostly 
anonymous statements. ER10 2186-88. This “evidence” is in the record solely 
                                                          
1
 Plaintiffs offer this counter statement to address certain factual characterizations 
made by Defendants. 
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through the premature Horne Finding. Repeating hearsay as fact does not make it 
reliable, and this Court should regard Horne’s narrative not for the truth of its 
characterizations of the MAS Program, but rather as reflecting “problematic 
assumptions and implicit biases” recognized by the court below. ER1 29. 
Moreover, Defendants’ contention that Superintendent Huppenthal did not 
eliminate MAS, Appellees’ Br. at 21, ignores the fact that as state senator he 
inserted the amendment that gave enforcement authority to the state 
superintendent, an office for which he was then running, and that once he assumed 
that office, Huppenthal proceeded to enforce the statute against TUSD until he was 
assured that the program was terminated and that all MAS textbooks and 
instructional material were removed from TUSD classrooms. Opening Br. at 12, 
14, 16-20.  
Huppenthal’s actions, while campaigning for state superintendent and once 
he assumed that office, echoed Horne’s problematic assumptions and biases. First, 
he campaigned on a promise to “stop La Raza.” ER10 at 2169. Although the MAS 
program was previously called “Mexican American/Raza Studies,” Huppenthal’s 
campaign promise reflected a deeper animus toward Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans. TUSD changed the name of the program to MAS in October 2009, 
ER9 1952 ¶ 68, before Huppenthal’s campaign to become state superintendent. 
More importantly, Huppenthal’s campaign ad did not say that he was going to stop 
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“Raza Studies”; instead, the same politician who had voted as a state senator for 
SB 1070 promised in a statewide election campaign to “stop La Raza,” where “La 
Raza” is a term commonly used and understood to refer to people of Mexican 
descent.
2
 
Second, after ordering an independent audit, Huppenthal disregarded the 
auditor’s final report (“Cambium Audit”) when the auditor found not only that 
TUSD was not in violation of A.R.S. § 15-112(A) but rather that “the opposite is 
true.” Opening Br. at 15 (citing ER10 2198-2201; 2248). Huppenthal admits that 
he rejected the audit because he claimed to “have a lot of information that what 
was going on in Mexican-American Studies did not match what [Cambium] 
observed in that week.” ER9 2025. The audit did not confirm the accusation he 
made in 2009 during a state senate committee hearing, that students in MAS 
classes were being indoctrinated “to have a certain mindset of us versus them.” 
Opening Br. at 11 (quoting S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing). In other words, 
Huppenthal contemporaneously explained that he disregarded the Cambium Audit 
because it did not conform to his preconceived notions of what happened in MAS 
classrooms. 
                                                          
2
 See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (online), available at 
http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=la+raza&submit.x=0&submit.y=0 
(last visited June 2, 2014) (defining “La Raza” as “Mexicans or Mexican 
Americans considered as a group, sometimes extending to all Spanish-speaking 
people of the Americas”). 
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Further, two reasons offered by Defendants to justify disregarding the 
Cambium Audit are at odds with facts in the record. First, Defendants claim that 
Huppenthal rejected the Cambium Audit because “Cambium allowed one of the 
creators of MAS to control the structure of the audit, as well as which classes the 
auditors visited and when.” Appellees’ Br. at 13-14.3 However, the factual finding 
made by the ALJ and adopted by Huppenthal was that the MAS director told the 
MAS teachers that “the auditors were going to make unannounced observations of 
their classes.” ER6 1122. Likewise, the Cambium Audit stated that “[t]he 
classroom observations and class visitation schedule was neither announced, nor 
released to TUSD personnel with the goal of obtaining the most reliable data and 
maintain the integrity of the audit.” ER10 2213. Second, Defendants claim that 
Huppenthal discredited the Cambium Audit because the auditors “watched very 
few classes of instruction.” Appellees’ Br. at 14. But see Opening Br. at 15 
(“auditors visited 39.5% of the high school Mexican American Studies classes”). 
Yet when the Arizona Department of Education subsequently conducted its own 
investigation at Huppenthal’s order, it conducted zero classroom observations. ER6 
1265 (Huppenthal admitting during ALJ hearing that to his knowledge no one on 
his staff conducted any classroom visits or focus groups). In their effort to discredit 
                                                          
3
 Defendants’ only citation to the record is to the identical, unsupported allegation 
made by Huppenthal in a television program interview. See Appellees’ Br. at 13-14 
(citing ER6 1286). 
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the Cambium Audit, Defendants go too far. 
Although Defendants seek to demonize MAS
4
 as a horrific, “resentment-
based program,” Appellees’ Br. at 1-6, the program examined by Cambium, and 
known to TUSD administrators, teachers, and students, was far different. For 
example, the former principal of Tucson High Magnet School had, over a seven-
year period, conducted formal observations of MAS classes and teachers, made 
numerous informal “walk-throughs,” and spoke with students about their 
experiences in MAS classes. ER4 662, 665-71. He observed academically rigorous 
classes in which MAS teachers taught critical thinking by elucidating various 
viewpoints from students and fostering classroom dialogue in a respectful manner. 
ER4 669. More importantly, no MAS students or their parents complained of the 
classes or teachers, other than the types of complaints made about any class, such 
as grading disputes. ER4 674-75.  
                                                          
4
 In addition to the hearsay discussed supra, Appellees’ introduction relies upon 
selected quotes from books taken out of context and which were not established as 
being assigned in MAS courses. Appellees’ Br. at 1-2. But see Brief for Authors 
Rodolfo Acuna et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5-18, ECF No. 22 
(criticizing the state’s use of “out-of-context fragments, excerpts and intentionally 
omitted text” in books by amici and others removed from MAS classrooms). 
Further, even if assigned, the quoted text is presented without evidence of how the 
material was taught. Cf. Brief for 48 Public School Teachers as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 2, ECF No. 24 (“[r]emoving books based on isolated and 
purportedly offensive snippets or on generalizations . . . overlooks one of the most 
important functions of education: teaching students to read a text within its 
historical, cultural, and situational contexts and to analyze it accordingly”). 
Defendant Huppenthal admits as much when he said that Adolf Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf could be taught, albeit with care, in the classroom. ER2 253. 
Case: 13-15657     06/02/2014          ID: 9117183     DktEntry: 52     Page: 15 of 70
 7 
 
 
After an extensive three-phase audit, Cambium confirmed the former 
principal’s assessment that there was no evidence that MAS courses promoted 
resentment. ER10 2253. In fact, “auditors observed the opposite, as students are 
taught to be accepting of multiple ethnicities of people.”5 Id. Cambium concluded 
that MAS courses did not promote resentment, that students from varied 
backgrounds participated in MAS courses, and that students from varied 
backgrounds were taught and inspired in the same manner as their Mexican 
American counterparts. Id. Thoughtful and respectful engagement and analysis 
were core expectations of lessons, whether students were discussing instructional 
material or their own projects. ER10 2248-53. And, by utilizing material relevant 
to students’ present and historical experiences, MAS educators maximized student 
engagement,
6
 evidenced also by the growth of the program from its inception in 
1998 to April 2011, the term immediately preceding the June 15, 2011, Huppenthal 
                                                          
5
 As an example of MAS promoting understanding, Cambium cited a MAS guiding 
principle, En Lak’ech: “You are my other me. If I do harm to you, I do harm to me. 
If I love and respect you, I love and respect myself.” ER10 2251. A student 
enrolled in MAS explained, “It’s almost impossible for us to be racist in these 
classes because, [En Lak’ech] – like, you are my other me. It’s like impossible – 
we are taught to be the opposite of racist.” ER10 2253. 
6
 Amici National Education Association and Arizona Education Association 
discuss the way that ethnic studies programs serve a crucial role in fostering 
minority academic achievement generally and specifically how the MAS Program 
was a pedagogically sound and well-designed ethnic studies program. See Brief for 
National Education Association and Arizona Education Association as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8-20, 20-26, ECF No. 18. 
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Finding of Violation, when 1,343 students in six high schools and five middle 
schools were enrolled in at least one of 43 MAS courses offered. Opening Br. at 6. 
Increased student engagement and the teaching of critical thinking resulted 
in improved test scores and graduation rates as demonstrated by an internal MAS 
study, ER9 1854-79; independently verified by the Cambium Audit, ER10 2247; 
and confirmed by University of Arizona researchers retained by the special master 
in the ongoing TUSD desegregation lawsuit, ER2 197-203. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the 2009 Post Unitary Status Plan (“PUSP”) for TUSD required that 
MAS be retained and expanded to meet student needs. ER11 2425-26. The 
successful results achieved by the program were relied upon in the desegregation 
case to require in the new USP the development of culturally relevant courses and 
classes for Mexican American and African American students. See Brief for Chief 
Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy and Anti-Defamation League as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12, ECF No. 21-2 (“Warren Amicus Br.”).7 
Finally, Defendants’ contention that the case is likely moot because this 
Court will be unable to grant a remedy, Appellees’ Br. at 7 n.1, ignores the fact 
that Arizona continues to seek enforcement of A.R.S. § 15-112 in Tucson’s 
longstanding desegregation case. See Warren Amicus Br. at 11-13, ECF No. 21-2. 
In denying the state’s motion to intervene in the desegregation case, the court 
                                                          
7
 We include the ECF number for this docket for amicus briefs filed in the present 
appeal. 
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noted that the “State objects to subsection D(6), Engaging Latino and African 
American students, only as to the Latino students,” and that the “State does not 
appear to argue any and all culturally relevant courses will necessarily violate 
A.R.S. § 15-112 because it does not object to culturally relevant courses for 
African American students.” Order at 12, 16, Fisher v. Lohr, No. CV 74-90-TUC-
DCB (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2013), ECF No. 1436. The State continues to single out 
Latino students for different treatment. See ER2 166-67 (State’s Second Motion for 
Reconsideration of Its Motion to Intervene Due to Major Changes in 
Circumstance). In the present case, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief 
that would put a stop to the State’s ongoing enforcement activity, which will free 
Plaintiffs and their siblings (who are seeking to join as plaintiffs)
8
 from the State’s 
efforts to unconstitutionally infringe their right to receive information and right to 
due process of law and equal protection under the law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Equal Protection. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims on procedural and substantive grounds. First, 
the District Court erred by granting summary judgment based on preliminary 
injunction briefing, and Circuit precedent shows Defendants’ arguments to the 
contrary are inapposite.  
                                                          
8
 Motion for Joinder Submitted Jointly by Plaintiffs and Proposed Joinder Plaintiffs 
has been filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
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Second, the District Court erred substantively by granting summary 
judgment after resolving factual disputes against the Plaintiff. Defendants attempt 
to discount Plaintiffs’ evidence showing that racial animus was at the heart of the 
enactment and enforcement of A.R.S. § 15-112 by looking at each piece of 
evidence individually, and ignoring the cumulative effect of all of the evidence. 
This evidence reflects, inter alia, that Defendants singled out the MAS program for 
scrutiny, that the legislators who passed the statute made contemporaneous 
remarks reflecting their discriminatory animus, and that the process by which 
Defendants enforcing the statute against TUSD was marked by procedural 
irregularities. Finally, the statute should be subject to strict scrutiny under the 
political process Equal Protection theory because the state displaced a local 
program designed to remedy discrimination. 
First Amendment. Preliminarily, Defendants’ sweeping argument that the 
state has plenary control over curricular decisions overstates the law in this Circuit. 
The First Amendment bars Defendants from eliminating programs such as MAS 
based solely on viewpoint and without a legitimate pedagogical objective. 
Moreover, questions of fact exist as to whether Defendants did exactly that when 
they required TUSD to eliminate MAS on pain of losing 10 percent of its funding 
on a retroactive basis. 
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The District Court correctly held that A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3), which 
prohibits courses “designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” was 
overbroad. Further, and contrary to the District Court, the remainder of the statute 
is also overbroad, threatening to chill legitimate expression. For example, § 15-112 
bans classes that “promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” or 
“advocate ethnic solidarity,” but does not define any of these terms.  
 The statute is also unconstitutionally vague, infringing Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment right to receive information. Defendants do not argue that the statute 
is clear, but instead advance a variety of arguments that fail because they ignore (1) 
that Plaintiffs’ claim is rooted in the First Amendment; and (2) that Plaintiffs can 
establish a statute is vague if it invites arbitrary enforcement. Defendants’ 
rejoinders that the statute was not vague because they can advise districts on its 
meaning or because it was actually enforced against TUSD only exemplify the 
dangers of arbitrary enforcement posed by a vague statute. 
 Finally, A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3) is not severable because legislative intent 
suggests the statute would not have been enacted without that provision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS. 
 
The district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 
Equal Protection claims was improper and should be reversed on procedural and 
substantive grounds. 
A. The District Court’s Sua Sponte Grant Was Procedurally 
Improper. 
 
Defendants do not claim Plaintiffs had notice that their Equal Protection 
claims were subject to summary judgment. Rather, they argue the issue was fully 
and fairly ventilated because the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction is 
higher than the standard to survive summary judgment. Appellees’ Br. at 43-45. 
This distinction is meaningless. Although the cases cited by Defendants state the 
standard for a preliminary injunction, they are silent on whether evidence 
presented in a preliminary injunction motion results in an issue being fully and 
fairly ventilated. Defendants fail to address the authorities cited in Plaintiffs’ 
Opening Brief holding that a preliminary injunction motion is insufficient to fully 
or fairly ventilate an issue for the purposes of summary judgment. Opening Br. at 
25-26.  
Defendants attempt to minimize the additional evidence Plaintiffs would 
introduce if properly given an opportunity to oppose summary judgment. 
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Appellees’ Br. at 45. But even the non-exhaustive evidence identified by Plaintiffs 
in their Opening Brief is significant. See Opening Br. at 26. For example, 
Defendants claim complaints justified their decision to target MAS while ignoring 
other ethnic studies programs. Appellees’ Br. at 38-39. But evidence regarding the 
relationship between the ethnic studies ban and Arizona’s anti-immigration efforts 
targeting Mexicans and Mexican Americans, as well as emails between legislators 
and private citizens advocating the ban, demonstrate that many of these complaints 
were rooted in animus towards Mexicans irrespective of their country of birth. 
Defendants cannot justify the law by claiming they were only acceding to the 
private biases of its citizens. See Part I.B.2. (Disparate Treatment) below. 
B. The District Court Substantively Erred in Granting Summary 
Judgment. 
 
Defendants fail to show that undisputed facts merit summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims. They merely single out pieces of evidence and 
declare each individually insufficient, ignore other pieces of evidence, or dispute 
the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. But “the evidence and inferences 
therefrom” are to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the district court ruled.” Allen v. A.H. Robins Co., 752 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 
1985). “Courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party 
seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per 
curiam). In Tolan, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit committed reversible error 
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“[b]y failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual 
conclusions,” and had “improperly ‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and resolved disputes 
in favor of the moving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Thus, the proper test is whether the evidence, taken as a 
whole and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, is enough to create a 
triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants enacted or enforced A.R.S. § 
15-112 with discriminatory intent. Under this standard, because the district court 
did not credit Plaintiffs’ evidence that contradicted the court’s factual conclusions 
and improperly weighed the evidence and resolved disputes in favor of 
Defendants, summary judgment should be reversed. 
1. A.R.S. § 15-112 Facially Discriminates. 
 
At the outset, A.R.S. § 15-112 is subject to strict scrutiny because it 
discriminates on its face.
9
 The term “ethnic,” as it is used in the statute, connotes 
an ethnic minority. Horne admitted as much when he stated, in response to a 
request to define the term, that ethnic “obviously” referred to racial minorities such 
as Mexican Americans. Opening Br. at 27-28. This admission may properly be 
considered as an expression of legislative intent, and used to interpret the statute if 
                                                          
9
 Plaintiffs have never conceded, as Defendants claim, Appellees’ Br. at 37 (citing 
ER5 913), that the statute does not include an express classification. The district 
court made the same error. ER1 25. Although Plaintiffs concede the statute does 
not expressly single out Mexican Americans, they have always claimed the law is 
“not facially neutral.” ER5 913.  
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its plain meaning is ambiguous. See Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 
430 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a statute’s terminology is not clear 
on its face, it is appropriate to seek guidance in the legislative history.” (citation 
omitted)).  
2. The Enactment and Enforcement of A.R.S. § 15-112 Were 
Motivated by Discriminatory Intent. 
 
Even if facially neutral, A.R.S. § 15-112 and Defendants’ enforcement 
actions are subject to strict scrutiny because the statute’s enactment and 
enforcement were motivated by discriminatory intent. Opening Br. at 28-36. 
Defendants agree that Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), states the relevant “non-
exhaustive” factors to be considered to determine discriminatory intent. Appellees’ 
Br. at 38. However, like the district court, they misapply these factors by 
minimizing the importance of relevant evidence, characterizing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the State, and looking at each piece of evidence separately 
rather than the larger picture. This Court has made clear that under the Arlington 
Heights analysis, “‘very little … evidence’” of discriminatory intent is needed “‘to 
raise a genuine issue of fact.’” Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 
730 F.3d 1142, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 
80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996)). “‘[A]ny indication of discriminatory motive 
… may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder.’” Id. 
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(emphasis added). Even the district court noted that Defendants’ actions were 
“suggestive of discriminatory intent.” ER1 28. Defendants simply ignore the 
applicable standard needed to survive summary judgment; significantly, they do 
not even reference the well-established presumption that evidence and inferences 
are read in Plaintiffs’ favor when reciting the standard of review. Compare 
Appellees’ Br. at 20 with Opening Br. at 23. The evidence, considered in totality, 
shows that Defendants were motivated by animus toward Mexican Americans. At 
the very least, there is enough such evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
Disparate Treatment 
Defendants concede that A.R.S. § 15-112 was specifically passed in 
response to MAS classes in TUSD, Appellees’ Br. at 41, and that it has only been 
enforced against MAS, id. at 38. But they claim, without support, that a “single 
instance of enforcement” cannot show a pattern of discrimination. Id. That is 
nonsense. TUSD’s MAS courses were the only school district-adopted K-12 
Mexican American Studies courses in the state. There was no other MAS program 
for Defendants to eliminate, and Defendant Huppenthal investigated no other 
program in the state, nor did he consider investigating any other classes in the 
state. ER6 1257. Ninety percent of the students in MAS were Latinos. ER10 2203. 
Defendants’ enforcement action affected thousands of Mexican Americans who 
Case: 13-15657     06/02/2014          ID: 9117183     DktEntry: 52     Page: 25 of 70
 17 
 
 
were either enrolled in MAS classes or eligible to enroll in order to benefit from 
the substantial educational advantages it provided to Mexican American students. 
ER10 2242-47 (documenting positive impact of MAS on test scores and graduation 
rates). Because Defendants did not enforce the statute against any other ethnic 
studies program, this single act is evidence of discriminatory treatment, which 
disparately impacted Mexican Americans. 
Next, Defendants offer purported justifications for targeting MAS. 
Appellees’ Br. at 38-39. Their claim that it is not feasible to investigate every 
Arizona school’s curricula does not address the undisputed fact that two other 
TUSD programs – its African American Studies program and Pan Asian Studies 
program – potentially violate the statute and that both Horne and Huppenthal knew 
of these potential violations. The 2010 Horne Finding stated: “Three of the four 
[ethnic studies programs] could be found in violation under criterion three, courses 
designed for pupils of a particular ethnic group.” ER10 2184. Huppenthal 
acknowledges his awareness of other ethnic studies programs in the state but 
claims that those programs are done right, ER5 805, even though he admits that he 
never investigated any other ethnic studies program. ER6 1257.  
Defendants then claim that MAS was “the largest of its kind in the State” 
and “was the only program the Superintendent knew about that offered courses 
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toward fulfillment of graduation requirements.”10 Appellees’ Br. at 38-39. First, 
because nothing in the statute speaks to the size of a program or whether it offers 
courses that fulfill graduation requirements, these reasons provide no statutory 
basis for targeting MAS. Second, Defendants offered these justifications for the 
first time during the course of litigation. Defendants cannot hide their 
discriminatory intent by offering post hoc justifications that are merely a pretext to 
provide constitutional cover for the impermissible actions taken. See United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (a justification for discriminatory action 
“must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation”). 
At the very least, whether the justification provided by Defendants is a pretext is a 
material issue of disputed fact that must be determined after a trial.  
Finally, Defendants claim MAS was the only program that generated 
complaints. Appellees’ Br. at 38-39. However, this squarely presents genuine 
issues of material fact regarding whether the complaints were infected with 
impermissible racial animus towards Mexican Americans. There is ample evidence 
that the complaints about MAS in the record and legislative history were infected 
with impermissible racial animus towards Mexican Americans. Opening Br. 9-12, 
33 (discussing remarks by legislators and private citizen complaints). It is 
                                                          
10
 Whether MAS courses were the only ethnic studies courses offered for credit is a 
disputed issue of material fact. See, e.g., ER6 1235, 1245 (Pueblo Magnet and 
Tucson Magnet High School course catalogs indicating that “Literature, Native 
American, 1 2” satisfies English 11). 
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impermissible for the law to give effect to private biases. See, e.g., Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”); Pac. Shores, 730 
F.3d at 1163 n.26 (“legislatures may not ‘defer[] to the [discriminatory] wishes or 
objections of some fraction of the body politic.’”) (quoting City of Cleburne, Texas 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)). 
Sequence of events leading to the challenged law and its enforcement.  
The legislative history behind A.R.S. § 15-112, which the district court 
never considered before granting summary judgment sua sponte, is also highly 
suggestive of discriminatory intent. Defendants concede that historical 
background, the sequence of events leading to the law and its enforcement against 
MAS, and legislative history are all relevant factors under the Arlington Heights 
analysis. Appellees’ Br. at 38. However, they dismiss and mischaracterize the 
evidence regarding these factors – particularly statements of legislators – as “not 
reliable” and “subject to dispute.” Appellees’ Br. at 39-40 & 39 n.19.11 First, this 
                                                          
11
 Defendants ask this Court to deny Plaintiffs request for judicial notice, citing 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1186 (E.D. 
Cal. 2010). Appellees’ Br. at 39 n.19. But in Rocky Mountain, the court took 
judicial notice of the legislative histories and, to the extent that the legislative 
histories conflicted, resolved all disputes in favor of plaintiffs on a motion to 
dismiss. 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. Here, it is appropriate for this Court to take 
judicial notice of legislative history, and, to the extent there are any disputes 
regarding the legislative history, this Court must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866. Additionally, the other 
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inverts the summary judgment standard on its head. Defendants can argue the 
reliability and weight of the evidence, and dispute any inferences therefrom, at 
trial. But at the summary judgment stage, this evidence must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs, with all “reasonable inferences … drawn in favor of 
the nonmoving party.” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868. Second, Defendants’ claim that 
this evidence is not reliable is plainly contrary to Arlington Heights, which states 
that “the legislative . . . history may be highly relevant, especially where there are 
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.” 429 U.S. at 
268 (emphasis added). Courts routinely look at statements by legislators to 
determine whether discriminatory intent motivated the passage of a law. See, e.g., 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (relying on legislative history 
to invalidate Alabama’s felon disfranchisement provision because it was 
“motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race”); Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-42 (1993) 
(examining city council members’ motives and comments to determine whether 
law was passed with improper purpose). 
Defendants do not dispute that the legislative and official statements 
Plaintiffs identified in the enactment and enforcement of the statute were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
documents subject to Plaintiffs’ RJN are reports of administrative bodies or 
publicly available agency files and are thus judicially noticeable. See Oregon Ass’n 
of Homes for the Aging, Inc. v. Oregon, 5 F.3d 1239, 1243 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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suggestive of animus. Rather, they wrongly characterize the evidence as the “views 
of a single legislator” or “stray comments.”12 Appellees’ Br. at 39-40. But the 
evidence shows that multiple legislators made comments evincing animus towards 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans while advocating for the bill, consistently 
describing Mexican Americans as not sufficiently “American,” and as “anti-
American,” “rude,” “separatists,” and “seditious.” Opening Br. at 9-13, 32-33 
(describing comments of multiple legislators).  
Furthermore, Defendants employed similar discriminatory language. See 
Opening Br. at 13-14 (discussing language in Horne Finding and Huppenthal’s 
campaign). In his campaign for State Superintendent, Huppenthal promised that if 
elected he would “stop La Raza,” a double entendre that could be understood as a 
promise to stop the Mexicans, which serves as clear evidence that his pursuit of 
MAS was motivated by animus against Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Id. at 
13, 34. 
                                                          
12
 The cases Defendants rely on, Appellees’ Br. at 39-40, are inapposite because 
they do not address whether a law was passed with discriminatory intent, which 
implicates the motivation and potential animus of the legislators passing the law. 
Instead, all of Defendants’ cases discuss statements by legislators only with regard 
to statutory interpretation. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740 
(2012) (discussing how the views of an individual legislator affects statutory 
interpretation); Sempre Ltd. P’ship v. Maricopa Cnty., 235 P.3d 259 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2010) (same); Golder v. Dep’t of Revenue, 599 P.2d 216 (Ariz. 1979) (same); 
In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).  
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Similar coded language about Mexicans and Mexican Americans was used 
by numerous legislators and citizens advocating for the ethnic studies ban equating 
Mexican Americans and MAS students with being rude, resentful, defiant, angry, 
and anti-American. See Opening Br. at 32-33; Brief for Latina and Latino Critical 
Legal Theory, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13-16, ECF No. 23 
(“LatCrit Amicus Br.”). Courts have found similar statements and “coded” 
language containing group-based suppositions and pernicious stereotypes based on 
race or other group characteristics evidence of racial animus. See, e.g., Kesser v. 
Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 354-56 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment 
based on evidence of racial animus where prosecutor relied on “blatant racial and 
cultural stereotypes” characterizing certain Native Americans as “troublesome,” 
“resistive,” and “somewhat suspicious” of the criminal justice system); RK 
Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1051-1052, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding genuine issue of fact existed due to government officials’ 
stereotypes and presumptions about African Americans, hip hop music, and crime, 
which constituted “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent); Doe v. Vill. of 
Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding statements 
by community members and government officials characterizing Latino day 
laborers as dangerous and violent constituted evidence of animus). 
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Finally, Defendants simply ignore additional evidence that legislators and 
government officials used false and misleading claims to promote the bill and 
enforce it against MAS classes. See Opening Br. at 33. Here, Horne exploited anti-
Mexican American sentiment by falsely claiming that MAS students wanted to 
eliminate the border between the U.S. and Mexico, ER6 1056, revealing an animus 
towards Mexican Americans. Similarly, Defendants’ sweeping and inflammatory 
mischaracterizations of all MAS courses and texts as “un-American” that teach 
exclusively about “their culture” and “narrow backgrounds” and perpetuating a 
“mental model of failure” is highly probative of discriminatory intent.  
Departures from normal procedures.  
Defendants do not dispute that Horne departed from normal procedures 
when he issued his Finding of Violation by applying the statute retroactively and 
circumventing the 60-day safe-harbor period. Opening Br. at 33-34. Rather, they 
argue, as the district court found, that Huppenthal corrected any procedural defects 
by issuing his own findings. Appellees’ Br. at 41-42. Their argument misses the 
point, which is not whether procedural defects were corrected. Instead, the fact that 
the procedure was distorted in the first place is evidence of animus. This also 
ignores evidence showing that Huppenthal shared Horne’s “single-minded focus,” 
ER1 28, on eliminating MAS and that he engaged in additional procedural 
irregularities to ensure MAS was found in violation of the law. 
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It is undisputed that Huppenthal rejected the very audit he commissioned – 
the Cambium Report – and its finding that MAS did not violate A.R.S. § 15-112, 
purportedly because auditors only observed 39.5 percent of high school MAS 
courses for an average of approximately thirty minutes per class period. Opening 
Br. at 35; Appellees’ Br. at 42. Defendants argue that Huppenthal was justified in 
rejecting the Cambium Report because of these alleged “deficiencies.” Appellees’ 
Br. at 42. But to believe this purported “justification,” one would have to accept 
that Huppenthal and the ADE “cured” these “deficiencies” by visiting no classes at 
all. ER6 1262. Similarly, Defendants ignore Huppenthal’s reliance on a small 
sample of written excerpts of course materials – without verification of whether or 
how those excerpts were presented to students – even though he rejected the 
Cambium Report because of a purported “variance between the written materials 
and what was actually going on in the classroom.” ER6 1268. Defendants offer no 
explanation for the discrepancy between Huppenthal’s assessment of the Cambium 
audit (which he found lacking) and his own far more deficient and superficial 
“analysis” of MAS. The only reasonable explanation is that Huppenthal was intent 
on finding that MAS violated the statute, regardless of the evidence, to make good 
on his promise to “Stop La Raza.” ER6 1288. 
Finally, Huppenthal’s sweeping elimination of all MAS classes, ER6 1151-
52, despite the ALJ’s more limited finding only that “at least one or more classes 
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or courses” violated the statute, ER6 1148, is both a substantive departure from his 
statutorily proscribed duties as Superintendent, see A.R.S. § 15-251, as well as an 
irregular application of the statute, and evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., 
Pac. Shores Props, 730 F.3d at 1164; Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 733 F.2d 
660, 663 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Totality of Evidence 
Under the Arlington Heights factors, a proper analysis looks at the totality of 
evidence to determine whether discriminatory animus was a motivating factor 
behind the law. See, e.g., Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 1162-64. Defendants 
attempt to hide the animus motivating the enactment and enforcement of A.R.S. § 
15-112 by addressing each piece of evidence in isolation and declaring it 
insufficient. But a court must look at the totality of the evidence aggregated in 
Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief, at 30-35, including: 
 Ninety percent of students in MAS were Latinos, even though only sixty 
percent of students in TUSD are Latinos.  
 The sole purpose of A.R.S. § 15-112 was to eliminate MAS. Defendants 
concede the law was passed specifically in response to complaints about 
MAS. It has only been enforced against MAS. 
 The law was passed in a climate charged with anti-immigration animus 
towards Mexicans and Mexican Americans, which Defendants do not 
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dispute. Rhetoric surrounding the anti-immigration debate included 
unfounded fears that Mexicans wanted to “reconquer” Arizona. 
 Similar rhetoric surrounded the enactment of A.R.S. § 15-112. For 
example, supporters of the bill claimed Latino students in MAS were not 
sufficiently “American” and that they needed to “adopt American 
values.” Students were stereotyped as “rude,” “defiant[],” “uncivil,” and 
“having contempt for authority.” ER6 1054-55, ER8 1802, ER10 2191-
92. Mexican Americans were compared unfavorably to Irish-Americans 
and Jewish-Americans because they would not assimilate like those latter 
groups. 
 Supporters made false and misleading statements to promote the bill, 
including falsely claiming MAS was teaching students to “incite riots” 
and kill people, and alleging that MAS was orchestrated by Mexico to 
take over America. 
 Defendants ignored other programs that appeared to violate the statute on 
their face, including programs designed for African Americans and Asian 
Americans. Defendants’ post hoc reasons for why they targeted MAS 
apply only to MAS. These additional “requirements” necessary to find a 
violation into the law are pretexts used to attack MAS while ignoring 
other programs. 
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 Horne’s issuance of a Finding of Violation on his last day of office and 
Huppenthal’s rejection of his own commissioned Cambium Report after 
it failed to give him the result he wanted demonstrate that they both were 
intent on finding MAS in violation regardless of the facts. 
 Huppenthal campaigned on the promise that he would “stop La Raza,” a 
double entendre which can be understood as a promise to stop the 
Mexicans. 
When viewed together, this evidence shows that animus towards Mexicans and 
Mexican Americans was a motivating factor behind the law. It is more than enough 
to clear the bar of “very little such evidence” this Court has set “to raise a genuine 
issue of fact” under Arlington Heights. Pac. Shores Props., 730 F.3d at 1159 (“any 
indication of discriminatory motive … may suffice to raise a question that can only 
be resolved by a fact-finder”) (quoting Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1409). 
C. Questions of Material Fact Exist as to Whether A.R.S. § 15-112 
Encourages the Infliction of an Injury Based on Race by 
Discontinuing and Removing from Local Control Efforts to 
Remedy Past Discrimination in Education. 
 
Defendants contend that A.R.S. § 15-112 does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because it does not impede citizens’ access to the political 
process to remedy discrimination, but “simply limits the ability of a public school 
to offer certain coursework.” Appellees’ Br. at 46. Defendants’ argument rests on a 
fundamental misapprehension of the relevant standard under Washington v. Seattle 
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School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969). Further, it ignores and mischaracterizes the purpose, history, and effect of 
both A.R.S. § 15-112 and TUSD’s MAS classes. See Opening Br. at 36-38. 
Specifically, by characterizing § 15-112 as simply “limit[ing] the ability of a public 
school to offer certain coursework,” Appellees’ Br. at 46, Defendants elide the key 
fact that the MAS program was designed to remedy past discrimination. See 
LatCrit Amicus Br. at 2-6, ECF No. 23 (discussing role of MAS in remedying de 
facto and past de jure discrimination against Mexican American students); Warren 
Amicus Br. at 2-4, ECF No. 21-2 (same). It was Defendants’ decision to eliminate 
and then remove local control over a program designed to remedy past 
discrimination that triggers strict scrutiny under the “political process” Equal 
Protection doctrine. 
Defendants’ argument rests on a fundamental misapprehension of the 
relevant precedent. In Seattle and Hunter, the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
government decisions to restructure the political process by imposing uniquely 
onerous impediments for remedying racial discrimination; these decisions had “the 
serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of race.” 
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights 
and Fight For Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 
(2014). In both the Seattle and Hunter cases, local government attempted to 
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remedy discrimination only to face referenda that both eliminated the remedy and 
removed the locality’s authority to remedy similar discrimination in the future. 
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (describing Hunter & Seattle).  
Similar to the laws challenged in Hunter and Seattle, A.R.S. § 15-112 was 
enacted to target and eliminate a local program (MAS classes) adopted by the 
traditional decision-making body (TUSD Governing Board) to address 
discrimination—here, the substantial educational disadvantages faced by Mexican 
Americans. The TUSD Governing Board voted to expand MAS as part of its 2009 
PUSP remedying past discrimination because the classes significantly improved 
test scores and graduation rates. ER1 26 n.15; ER9 1995-97. Further, like the laws 
challenged in Hunter and Seattle, A.R.S. § 15-112 targeted racial minorities by 
altering the political procedures available to effectively remedy past 
discrimination. Specifically, the statute (1) removed the TUSD Governing Board’s 
statutory authority to prescribe curricula only with respect to a program that 
remedies discrimination, cf. A.R.S. § 15-341(A)(5); and (2) required proponents of 
the program to seek “relief from the state legislature” rather than TUSD, Seattle, 
458 U.S. at 474.
13
 Thus, A.R.S. § 15-112 did not simply “limit[] . . . coursework,” 
                                                          
13
 This history also serves to distinguish Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th 
Cir. 2002), on which Defendants rely. The Valeria Court found that, standing 
alone, the facts that Proposition 227 had “a uniquely ‘racial focus,’” and affected a 
program “that inures primarily to the benefit of racial minorities,” did not make out 
a constitutional deprivation. Id. at 1042. However, the Valeria court recognized the 
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Appellees’ Br. at 46, but rather was an impermissible, intentional, and “carefully 
tailored” reworking of the political process that had both the risk and purpose of 
causing injuries on account of race. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (quoting Seattle, 
458 U.S. at 471).
14
 
 Finally, Defendants imply that A.R.S. § 15-112 does not burden the political 
process because minority students and parents can participate in developing a 
desegregation remedy in TUSD’s longstanding desegregation litigation, Fisher v. 
Lohr. No. 4:74-90 (D. Ariz.). Appellees’ Br. at 47. Yet, in that case, Defendants 
relied on A.R.S. § 15-112 when they moved to intervene in order to block the 
implementation of a court-ordered Unitary Status Plan mandating TUSD offer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
continued viability of the political process doctrine where governmental action 
targets programs that “remedy identified patterns of racial discrimination.” Id. at 
1040.  
14
 As illustrated above, the Supreme Court's recent plurality opinion in Schuette 
does not change the analysis. Unlike this case, Schuette involved the Michigan 
electorate’s vote to stop the practice of racial preferences in school admissions, a 
policy aimed at achieving diversity rather than remedying existing discrimination. 
134 S. Ct. at 1629-30. In his controlling opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected a broad 
reading of Seattle in which “any state action with a ‘racial focus’ that makes it 
‘more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups’ to ‘achieve 
legislation that is in their interest’ is subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1634. That 
principle has no application in a case, like this one, where the state imposed and 
selectively enforced a purposefully discriminatory policy that interfered with 
TUSD voters’ ability to remedy educational disparities resulting from widespread 
de facto and de jure school segregation. See id. at 1632 (procedural restructuring 
results in invidious discrimination where “there was a demonstrated injury on the 
basis of race that, by reasons of state encouragement or participation, became more 
aggravated”). 
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culturally relevant classes for Mexican American students as a remedy to TUSD’s 
intentional discrimination, ER2 160-196, 230-34, and is currently appealing the 
district court’s denial of intervention before this Court. See Ariz. Br., Fisher v. 
United States, No. 13-15691 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2013), ECF No. 15-1. 
D. Even If Not Subject to Strict Scrutiny, A.R.S. § 15-112 Fails 
Rational Basis Review. 
 
A.R.S. § 15-112 is also invalid because it is not rationally related to any 
legitimate governmental interest. Even if this Court concludes that Defendants’ 
actions against MAS were based on animus towards the students, teachers, and 
parents who supported the MAS program rather than Mexican Americans, 
Defendants’ decision to punish a politically unpopular or “controversial” group 
cannot be a legitimate state interest, even under rational basis review. See, e.g., 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973); Warren Amicus Br. at 20-33, ECF No. 21-2. (arguing 
that State’s enforcement against MAS fails rational basis review). Defendants offer 
no response to that assertion. 
II. DEFENDANTS VIOLATED THE FIRST AMENDMENT WHEN 
THEY ELIMINATED MAS. 
 
A. The First Amendment Applies to Decisions to Remove Materials 
From the Curriculum. 
 
Quite crucially, Defendants do not challenge the District Court’s conclusion 
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that the First Amendment limits the government’s authority to remove materials 
from a public school’s curriculum. ER1 13. Indeed, it is firmly established that the 
First Amendment protects “students’ right to receive information and ideas” in the 
context of the school curriculum. Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 
1983); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 Rather, Defendants’ contention is that “the Superintendent did not eliminate 
TUSD’s MAS curriculum. TUSD, a nonparty, made that decision.” Appellees’ Br. 
at 21. This, though, ignores that the Superintendent directly caused TUSD to 
remove books from its curriculum by finding that TUSD was not in compliance 
with state law because of its MAS program, ER6 1092-1094; imposing a fine of 10 
percent of TUSD’s state funding retroactive to August 15, 2011, and until TUSD 
came into compliance, ER6 1152; and requiring proof that all MAS instructional 
material was removed from classrooms, ER6 1162. As shown below, there was no 
way to keep a MAS program consistent with the Superintendent’s decree and 
Defendants do not offer any alternative to the contrary. Instead, Defendants assert 
that, rather than shutting down its MAS program, TUSD could have brought it into 
compliance with state law. Appellees’ Br. at 22. In other words, Defendants argue 
that TUSD could have implemented a different program in place of the MAS 
program. But that point—itself doubtful—is entirely non-responsive to Plaintiffs’ 
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argument that it was unconstitutional for the Superintendent to compel the 
elimination of the MAS program.  
Appellees ignore that on December 30, 2010, Superintendent Horne found 
that that all of TUSD’s MAS courses violated A.R.S. § 15-112, and gave TUSD 60 
days to eliminate all of its Mexican American Studies courses or have 10 percent 
of its budget withheld. ER10 2192. Superintendent Huppenthal immediately 
affirmed this decision and then later, on June 15, 2011, found all TUSD MAS 
courses to violate A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(2)-(4). ER10 2194-96. On January 6, 2012, 
despite a finding by the ALJ only that “at least one or more classes or courses . . . 
were in violation,” Huppenthal again found the entire MAS program in violation. 
ER6 1151. In light of these conclusions by the Superintendents, it is disingenuous 
for Defendants to suggest that TUSD had any alternative except to eliminate the 
MAS program or face severe sanctions. The State of Arizona, through its 
Superintendents of Schools, ordered an end to the MAS program, and the 
Defendants cannot now avoid responsibility for this decision when TUSD carried 
out its order. 
Defendants also argue that the Constitution places “few restrictions on the 
State’s right to establish curricular standards.” Appellees’ Br. at 23. In fact, 
Defendants go so far as to claim that the government has “plenary authority over 
curricular standards.” Id. at 24. This, however, significantly overstates the 
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government’s authority and entirely ignores the First Amendment. Many Supreme 
Court decisions and rulings of this Court have recognized “certain constitutional 
limits upon the power of a State to control even the curriculum and the classroom.” 
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861 
(1982); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down statute 
prohibiting teaching of foreign languages in public and private schools); Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968) (striking down law banning teaching of 
evolution in public schools and universities); Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1027-29 
(discussing constitutional limits on power of state to control curriculum). 
The Defendants’ claim of “plenary authority” over the curriculum would 
mean that a school district could do anything it wants. It could remove all books 
written by authors known to be Democrats or all works criticizing the governor. 
Although, of course, there is deference to the government in making curricular 
decisions, the cases are clear that the deference is not unlimited and does not 
warrant judicial abdication. The government violates the First Amendment when it 
makes curricular decisions in an effort to suppress a particular viewpoint and when 
it interferes with the ability of students to receive information. Pico, 457 U.S. at 
867. See also Brief for Freedom to Read Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 7-10, ECF No. 17 (“Freedom to Read Amicus Br.”) 
(discussing cases that make clear that state may not restrict curricular materials for 
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narrowly partisan or political reasons). That is exactly what Defendants did in 
eliminating the MAS program. 
B. Questions of Material Fact Exist as to Whether Defendants 
Eliminated Forty-Three MAS Classes and Seven Books Based on 
Ideology Rather than Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns. 
 
 At the very least, there are important questions of material fact as to the 
reasons why the Superintendent eliminated the MAS classes and ordered the 
removal of books. Even with great deference to the government in making 
curricular decisions, it cannot eliminate a class or order the removal of a book 
purely out of dislike for the viewpoint or ideology expressed and without a 
legitimate pedagogical objective. As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘[g]overnment 
action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of 
a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential [First 
Amendment] right.’’ Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); see 
also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000) 
(state university may require students to pay a student activity fund so long as it 
does not engage in viewpoint discrimination in distributing the money). 
 The motive of the government in ordering the elimination of the MAS 
classes and the removal of the books is absolutely crucial in determining whether 
the First Amendment was violated. As this Court observed, “a student’s First 
Amendment rights are infringed when books that have been determined by the 
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school district to have legitimate educational value are removed from a mandatory 
reading list because of threats of damages, lawsuits, or other forms of retaliation.” 
Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1029; see also Delcarpio v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 
865 F. Supp. 350, 362-63 (E.D. La. 1994) (First Amendment violated where 
removal from school libraries of book about African tribal religions was based on 
school board members’ judgment that book gave students access to ideas board 
members considered objectionable), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Campbell v. 
St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of 
summary judgment and remanding because genuine issue of material fact existed 
whether school board members’ motivations violated students’ First Amendment 
right to receive information); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 
(N.D. Miss. 1980) (First Amendment violated by school district’s textbook 
committee by selecting books that supported segregation). 
  The district court erred by not making a factual determination as to the 
motivations of the Superintendent in finding that TUSD’s MAS program violated 
state law and effectively ending it. As explained in Appellant’s Opening Brief, the 
circumstances of the decision and the statements surrounding it provide a strong 
basis for inferring an impermissible motive. Opening Br. at 49-51; see also 
Freedom to Read Amicus Br. at 13-14, ECF No. 17 (discussing facts showing that 
Superintendents Horne and Huppenthal eliminated MAS for political reasons). At 
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the very least, this case must be remanded for an inquiry as to the motivation of the 
Superintendent and whether it was an impermissible desire to suppress a particular 
viewpoint from being expressed and from being received by the students. 
C. A.R.S. § 15-112 Is Facially Overbroad Because It Prohibits or 
Will Chill a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech. 
 
The overbreadth doctrine protects against the chilling of constitutionally 
protected speech that may arise from a threat of enforcement of an overbroad law. 
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 
944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The district court properly found A.R.S. § 15-
112(A)(3) overbroad, but erred in rejecting overbreadth challenges to the rest of § 
15-112(A). The concern with overbroad laws is always that they will chill 
constitutionally protected speech. Teachers in the TUSD know that if their speech 
is deemed to run afoul of the Arizona law it could cost the entire district 10 percent 
of its funding. Teachers thus know to stay far away from anything that might be 
deemed to violate A.R.S. § 15-112. This Court has recently emphasized that the 
First Amendment protects the speech of teachers. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 
412 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding the First Amendment protects the speech of teachers 
while on the job in the scope of their duties). This Court strongly reaffirmed: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom. “The vigilant protection of 
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constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools.” 
Id. at 411 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); see 
also LatCrit Amicus Br. at 30-32, ECF No. 23 (discussing overbreadth of A.R.S. § 
15-112 based on chilling of teacher and student speech).  
1. The District Court Was Correct in Holding that A.R.S. § 
15-112(A)(3) Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad.
15
 
 
A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3) prohibits courses that “[a]re designed primarily for 
pupils of a particular ethnic group.” The district court held that this was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and risked chilling speech protected by the First 
Amendment. The district court declared:  
[S]ection (A)(3) threatens to chill the teaching of legitimate and 
objective ethnic studies courses. The provision certainly is not an 
outright ban on ethnic studies courses because such courses are not 
solely for the benefit of members of the ethnicity being studied. But 
the provision’s broad and ambiguous wording could deter school 
districts from teaching ethnic studies. Significantly, such trepidation 
would not be unjustified given that Superintendent Horne found that 
three of the four Ethnic Studies courses at TUSD “could be found in 
violation” of § 15-112(A)(3). That then-Superintendent Horne elected 
to enforce the statute only against the MAS program, and not the other 
two programs, only underscores the breadth and ambiguity of this 
provision. 
 
ER1 19-20.  
                                                          
15
 Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees make their response to Defendants’ cross-
appeal in this section. 
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The district court emphasized that § 15-112(A)(2) already prohibits a class 
that “promote[s] resentment towards a race.” It thus explained, “But if such a class 
does not promote resentment, then what legitimate purpose is served by forbidding 
such classes?” ER1 19. The district court thus “conclude[d] that § 15-112(A)(3) is 
facially overbroad. The provision does not promote any legitimate interest that is 
not already covered by § 15-112(A) (2) and (A)(4), and also likely would chill the 
teaching of legitimate ethnic studies courses. In sum, it does not further any 
legitimate pedagogical interest.” ER1 20. 
Defendants respond to this by repeating their assertion of the “State’s broad 
discretion to set curricular standards and its expressed interest in reducing racism.” 
Appellees’ Br. at 33. But the State’s discretion does not include the ability to enact 
laws that are substantially overbroad and risk the chilling of protected speech. No 
Supreme Court decision or ruling of this Court has held that the overbreadth 
doctrine is inapplicable in the context of public schools. 
Defendants argue that “Subsection (A)(3) complements the remaining 
provisions of the statute, by ensuring that all courses and classes in Arizona public 
schools are not segregative and are designed for students of all ethnic groups.” Id. 
at 34. But this does not address the conclusions of the district court that these goals 
are already achieved by the other provisions in the statute and that the broad 
language of (A)(3) – prohibiting courses that “[a]re designed primarily for pupils 
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of a particular ethnic group” – “threatens to chill the teaching of legitimate and 
objective ethnic studies courses.” The statute offers no definition or criteria for 
determining what is a course “designed primarily” for those of a “particular ethnic 
group.” Any ethnic studies course could be perceived this way under the very broad 
statutory language. It is for exactly this reason that the district court correctly 
concluded that Subsection (A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
2. The District Court Erred in Rejecting the Overbreadth 
Challenge to the Other Parts of A.R.S. § 15-112(A). 
 
Section § 15-112(A) is substantially overbroad in using phrases such as “any 
courses or classes” and “promote resentment toward a race or class of people.” 
The concern with the former is that the ALJ found the inclusion of any prohibited 
content in “at least one class” was enough to find a violation of the statute, even if 
that content was not pervasive. ER7 1508. For example, an English class covering 
Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn could be found to violate 
A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(2). See Opening Br. at 55-56. This example illustrates the 
statute’s compounded overbreadth—not only is the statute overbroad in that 
Defendants could potentially conclude that Huckleberry Finn promotes resentment 
toward a race or class of people, but its inclusion in any part of a curriculum would 
be cause to eliminate the entire curriculum. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
473 (2010) (a law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more 
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speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated). See also Freedom to Read 
Amicus Br. at 22-23, ECF No. 17 (“specter of the serious financial and political 
consequences of violating . . . [A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(2)], combined with the 
uncertainty regarding which materials may be found improper, will lead Arizona’s 
responsible teachers to avoid materials that raise themes of racism, imperialism, or 
genocide”). 
The phrase “promote resentment toward a race or class of people” ((A)(2)) is 
impermissibly overbroad. There is no definition and there are no criteria for what it 
means to “promote resentment.” Even accepting the government’s interest in 
preventing “resentment,” the statutory language would be violated if anyone spoke 
negatively about a race or class of people in any way. The concern with this, like 
all overbroad laws, is that it will chill constitutionally protected speech. As the 
Supreme Court has expressed, the concern with such a “prohibition of alarming 
breadth” is that it will chill constitutionally protected expression. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
at 474. 
Defendants echo the district court and argue that the restrictions in § 15-
112(A) are not overbroad because “the statute ‘targets the design and 
implementation of courses and curricula.’” Appellees’ Br. at 32. The problem, 
though, is that the statute nowhere says that it is limited to the design and 
implementation of class and curricula. This would be a significant limit on the 
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reach of the law, but it is not in the statute.
16
 As the ALJ found, under the terms of 
the Arizona statute, a single class or even a single comment could be seen as 
“promoting” resentment based on race. It is precisely for this reason that the law is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Similarly, (A)(4) (“advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of 
pupils as individuals”) is overbroad. The district court noted correctly that 
prohibiting the teaching of ethnic solidarity would be unconstitutionally overbroad 
because “there is nothing inherently racist or divisive about ethnic solidarity.” ER1 
21. The court erred though in finding that the phrase, “instead of the treatment of 
pupils as individuals,” somehow corrects the overbreadth problem. Id. This 
presupposes that ethnic solidarity is somehow antithetical to the treatment of pupils 
as individuals and ignores that ethnic groups are made up of individuals. A further 
difficulty is that (A)(4)’s vagueness, Opening Br. at 41-42, lends to its overbreadth 
problem. 
Defendants have no response to Plaintiffs’ argument about the overbreadth 
of (A)(4), perhaps because they argue that Plaintiffs waived their overbreadth 
challenge to (A)(4) because it was not raised in Plaintiffs’ opening brief. 
Appellees’ Br. at 29 n.13. This is simply wrong. See Opening Br. at 56 n.13 
                                                          
16
 Defendants do not address our statutory construction argument about the explicit 
use of the word “designed” in (A)(3) and the failure to use the word “designed” in 
(A)(1), (2) and (4) other than a conclusory statement that theirs is the only 
construction that makes sense. Appellees’ Br. at 32. 
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(arguing that district court erred in finding (A)(4) not overbroad).
17
 
The issue of overbreadth is properly before this Court; overbreadth 
arguments for (A)(1) and (A)(4) were not waived; the court below was correct in 
deciding that (A)(3) was overbroad; but the court below erred in not finding the 
other provisions of A.R.S. § 15-112(A) overbroad. 
III. A.R.S. § 15-112 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
 
 Defendants offer little argument in support of A.R.S. § 15-112’s clarity. 
Instead, they offer arguments that mischaracterize the basis for Plaintiffs’ 
challenge (the First Amendment right to receive information). They ignore the core 
principle that a statute is impermissible if its vagueness invites arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement—Plaintiffs need not also demonstrate that the statute 
fails to give notice of what is prohibited. And, seeking to make virtue out of vice, 
Defendants make the circular argument that the fact that the statute was enforced 
against TUSD proves that it is not vague. Appellees’ Br. at 55. These arguments do 
not save the statute. 
                                                          
17
 Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs waived overbreadth with regard to (A)(1) 
is also incorrect. See Opening Br. at 52-53 (arguing that the phrases “any courses 
or classes” and “includes any” make all the proscriptions in A.R.S. § 15-112(A) 
overbroad). Further, Defendants’ contention that this argument was not raised 
below, Appellees’ Br. at 29, ignores that the court below ruled explicitly on this 
issue when it held that sections (A)(1) and (A)(2) were not overbroad because they 
do “not restrict individual class discussions, but instead only target[ ] the design 
and implementation of courses and curricula.” ER1 17 (emphasis added). 
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A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge A.R.S. § 15-112’s 
Vagueness Because It Impairs Their Right to Receive Information 
Through Programs Such as MAS. 
 
 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge A.R.S. § 15-112 
as unconstitutionally vague because (1) Plaintiffs do not allege that the statute is 
vague in every application; (2) A.R.S. § 15-112 applies to schools, not individuals; 
and (3) Plaintiffs must identify a constitutionally protected liberty or property 
interest. Appellees’ Br. at 48-49. All of these arguments fail for the same reason—
that Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge implicates their First Amendment right to 
receive information.
18
 In short, their right to receive information is a liberty interest 
that was infringed when the statute was applied to TUSD. Moreover, as 
Defendants themselves repeatedly recognize, prudential standing requirements are 
relaxed in vagueness challenges implicating speech. Appellees’ Br. at 48 & 49; see 
Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[a]lthough plaintiffs 
are generally limited to enforcing their own rights, standing is broader 
for facial First Amendment challenges”). As we discuss further below, Plaintiffs 
                                                          
18
 There is significant overlap between Defendants’ standing and merits arguments, 
which are flawed for similar reasons. E.g., Appellees’ Br. at 52 (arguing for 
application of vagueness standard that applies when a law “does not implicate a 
constitutionally protected right”). We discuss in greater detail below Defendants’ 
argument that Plaintiffs are required to show that A.R.S. § 15-112 is vague is all of 
its applications, Appellees’ Br. at 48-49. Infra Part III.B.1.  
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need not show that the statute is vague in every application or that it was applied to 
them. See Maldonado, 556 F.3d at 1044. 
Defendants ignore well-established precedent allowing plaintiffs to 
challenge restrictions on others’ conduct if the result is impairment of their own 
First Amendment right to receive information. See Johnson, 702 F.2d at 195-96 
(holding students had standing to challenge Oregon statute banning textbooks that 
spoke slightingly of the founders of the republic); Hynes v. Mayor & Council of 
Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 614-15, 621 n.5 (1976) (rejecting ordinance 
requiring canvassers to register, and noting that potential listeners had standing to 
challenge the vagueness of the canvassing statute based on impairment of their 
right to receive information from canvassers). “[W]here a speaker exists, . . . the 
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients 
both.” Johnson, 702 F.2d at 195 (holding existence of authors whose textbooks 
took banned perspective established that there were speakers willing to convey the 
information) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)). 
Here, TUSD consistently sought to continue offering the MAS program. 
After Huppenthal’s finding that MAS violated A.R.S. § 15-112, TUSD 
administratively appealed that finding, ER6 1085-1091, and terminated its MAS 
program only after Huppenthal’s order adopting the ALJ’s decision and directing 
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the withholding of TUSD funding. ER6 1151-52, 1159, 1161-63. This is enough to 
confer standing on the Plaintiff students to sue to protect their right to receive the 
benefits of that program. Moreover, this is true even if TUSD could not assert a 
First Amendment claim itself. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 & 65 
(1972) (plaintiffs could bring First Amendment claim based on right to receive 
information even though unadmitted and nonresident alien potential speaker could 
not have asserted First Amendment claim). 
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “have not identified any liberty or 
property interest” at stake in this case. But this again ignores that the right to 
receive is a liberty interest for the purposes of Due Process. See Krug v. Lutz, 329 
F.3d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that inmate, challenging the review of 
incoming materials excluded as obscene, had a liberty interest in the receipt of his 
subscription mailings sufficient to trigger procedural due process guarantees). 
Thus, Defendants’ standing arguments fail, and the Plaintiff students have standing 
to challenge A.R.S. § 15-112 because it deprives them of the opportunity to receive 
the information contained in the MAS curriculum.
19
 
                                                          
19
 Because Plaintiffs assert that A.R.S. § 15-112 impairs their right to receive the 
MAS curriculum, they assert more than a “generalized grievance.” Appellees’ Br. 
at 50 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013). Unlike 
plaintiffs in Hollingsworth v. Perry, who had no stake in the enforcement of 
Proposition 8 distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen, Plaintiffs, 
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B. A.R.S. § 15-112 Is Vague Because It Is Susceptible to Arbitrary 
and Discriminatory Enforcement. 
 
1. Plaintiffs Need Not Show There Is “No Set of 
Circumstances” Under Which the Statute Is Valid. 
 
Preliminarily, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “bear the high burden of 
proving that every application of the law is unconstitutional.” Appellees’ Br. at 48 
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). The flaw in this 
argument is apparent from Defendants’ very next sentence—the “no set of 
circumstances” standard does not apply to facial challenges arising in the First 
Amendment context. Id. (citing Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1042 (9th 
Cir. 2013)). For example, the Hynes Court struck down on vagueness grounds a 
statute requiring canvasser registration without first considering whether there was 
any conceivable circumstance in which the statute could be applied. 425 U.S. at 
620-21; see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking 
down ordinance prohibiting “three or more persons to assemble . . . in a manner 
annoying to persons passing by” on vagueness grounds, even though the ordinance 
“encompass[es] many types of conduct clearly within the city’s constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as TUSD students who seek, but are unable, to benefit from MAS, allege unique 
injury from the operation of A.R.S. § 15-112 to terminate MAS.  
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power to prohibit”). Thus, Plaintiffs need not show that the statute satisfies the “no 
set of circumstances” test in order to proceed with their facial challenge.20 
Likewise, that the statute has been applied to TUSD does not make a facial 
or an as-applied vagueness challenge “logically impossible.” Appellees’ Br. at 55. 
Were this true, there would be no post-enforcement appeals overturning statutes on 
vagueness grounds. Cf. Morales, 527 U.S. at 50, 60 (finding statute facially vague 
in appeal from criminal convictions); Coates, 402 U.S. at 612, 615 (same); United 
States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing procedure for 
criminal defendant to bring as-applied vagueness challenge after “the jury finds, on 
sufficient evidence, that he committed the statutory offense”).  
2. A.R.S. § 15-112 Is Vague Because It Lacks Standards 
Discouraging Arbitrary or Discriminatory Enforcement. 
 
Defendants’ argument that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague rests 
on a fundamental misapprehension of the applicable standard. Specifically, 
Defendants assert that a statute is “not unconstitutionally vague” if it provides “fair 
notice of what is prohibited or provides standards that discourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” Appellees’ Br. at 50 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
                                                          
20
 In any event, as this Court has observed, the ongoing validity of Salerno’s “no 
set of circumstances” test was called into doubt in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999). Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1042 n.11 (noting that Morales 
plurality “cast some doubt on the ‘no set of circumstances’ requirement for facial 
challenges”); Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 
971 (9th Cir. 2003) (Morales plurality “stated that the Salerno formulation was 
dictum”). 
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they devote much of their argument to showing that school districts have adequate 
notice of what is prohibited. That argument (itself contestable) is premised on a 
misstatement of law. In fact, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to 
provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct or it is so indefinite that it 
permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement—it need not fail under both 
prongs of the vagueness test. Maldonado, 556 F.3d at 1045 (quoting United States 
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Thus, much of Defendants’ vagueness 
argument is simply non-responsive to Plaintiffs’ argument that A.R.S. § 15-112 is 
unconstitutionally vague because it permits arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. See Appellees’ Br. at 51, 53 & 54 (discussing whether schools have 
notice of what is prohibited by A.R.S. § 15-112). 
 Moreover, Defendants’ arguments for why TUSD had adequate notice of 
what was prohibited illustrate exactly why the statute is prone to arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. For example, Defendants argue there is “no danger” 
that a school district will “be taken by surprise by the operation of the law” 
because schools may “request assistance” from ADE.21 Appellee Br. at 54. In other 
                                                          
21
 Defendants cite Huppenthal’s January 30, 2012, letter to TUSD, arguing that 
districts are provided resources to help with curricular planning, ER6 1163, but 
that letter refers to his offer of assistance in creating a new curriculum after TUSD 
was found in violation of A.R.S. § 15-112; it did not clarify the meaning of the 
statute prior to enforcement against TUSD. Further, while Defendants also argue 
that schools have “specialized knowledge” in the creation and implementation of 
curricular standards, Appellees’ Br. at 53-54, Defendants do not identify any 
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words, Defendants do not argue that the statute is clear; instead, they tout their own 
willingness to offer school districts the Superintendent’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 
15-112. The danger in this offer goes almost without saying—it leaves Defendants 
free to both advise school districts and enforce the statute according to their own 
whims, interpreting language such as promote “resentment toward a race or class 
of people” and “advocate ethnic solidarity” to ban unpopular programs. Cf. 
Morales, 527 U.S. at 64 (anti-loitering statute vague because it “affords too much 
discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public 
streets”).  
 Further, the danger that programs may be banned based on personal biases 
and popular will is more than hypothetical. Defendants themselves state that they 
pursued an enforcement proceeding against MAS because “constituents made 
complaints about it,” Appellees’ Br. at 12, and because the MAS program “was the 
most controversial course of study, generating numerous constituent complaints,” 
Appellees’ Br. at 38-39. This arrangement—in which many schools could be said 
to violate the statute but enforcement decisions turn on constituent complaints or 
whether the program is “controversial”—creates a “real risk” of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement where such complaints may reflect complainants’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
person or entity that had any specific knowledge, specialized or otherwise, of the 
meaning of the statute’s key terms, such as what courses “promote resentment” or 
“advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.”  
Case: 13-15657     06/02/2014          ID: 9117183     DktEntry: 52     Page: 59 of 70
 51 
 
 
biases. See United States v. Lanning, 723 F.3d 476, 483 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing 
“real risk” of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement where “citizen complaints” 
drive enforcement, because complaints may reflect complainants’ biases); see also 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1072) (“A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application.”). 
Defendants’ only response to Plaintiffs’ argument about the risks of arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement is that “a public school that violates the law” has 
several layers of protection against such arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Appellees’ Br. at 54. But none of the post-enforcement procedures that Defendants 
identify—notice of violation, the 60 days to come into compliance, the ability to 
request an administrative hearing, and the ability to seek judicial review, 
Appellees’ Br. at 54—cure the vagueness inherent in A.R.S. § 15-112. First, these 
asserted protections are available only after Defendants have exercised their 
discretion to declare a school district in violation of the law so cannot guard 
against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Second, a statute is no less vague 
if an aggrieved party has the opportunity to seek judicial review of an adverse 
action. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (fact that 
individual arrested under statute had opportunity to and in fact appealed was not 
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considered in holding that statute requiring a suspect to provide “credible and 
reliable” identification was unconstitutionally vague). Third, none of these 
procedures clarified what it means to promote “resentment towards a race or class 
of people,” A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(2), or “advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the 
treatment of pupils as individuals,” A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(4). See Opening Br. at 40-
42. Contrary to Defendants’ claim that the ALJ decision cured the vagueness of the 
statute, Appellees’ Br. at 55, that decision failed to define the statute’s terms, 
Opening Br. at 44-45. Fourth, the availability of an administrative appeal provides 
no protection against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because, under 
Arizona law, the Superintendent can reject or modify the ALJ’s decision, A.R.S. § 
41-1092.08(B), leaving the ultimate decision within the Superintendent’s 
discretion. Further, where, as in the present case, the Superintendent decides to 
impose statutory penalties retroactively, a district takes an enormous risk by 
appealing. Here, after adopting the ALJ’s findings on January 6, 2012, 
Superintendent Huppenthal ordered that TUSD’s state funding be withheld 
retroactively, to August 15, 2011. ER6 1152. Thus, a district appealing a 
Superintendent’s decision does so only if it accepts the risk that it will be required 
to return funds to the State if the district is unsuccessful. 
Finally, even if the post-enforcement procedures cited by Defendants could 
provide a measure of protection against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
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(they cannot), the procedures in this case did not because Defendants were intent 
on finding MAS in violation of the statute. On December 30, 2010, the day before 
the effective date of A.R.S. § 15-112, Superintendent Horne found the entire MAS 
program in violation of the statute and gave TUSD 60 days to eliminate all of its 
MAS classes or have ten percent of its budget withheld. ER10 2192. Five days 
later, on his fourth day in office, Superintendent Huppenthal issued a press release 
supporting Horne’s finding. See Superintendent of Public Instruction John 
Huppenthal’s Official Statement on TUSD Violation of A.R.S. § 15-112, available 
at http://www.azed.gov/public-relations/files/2011/08/pr01-04-11.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2014). On June 15, 2011, after rejecting the findings of the independent 
Cambium audit, ER6 1259-62, Huppenthal issued his own findings that all MAS 
courses violated § 15-112, giving TUSD 60 days to come into compliance, ER6 
1092. At the conclusion of TUSD’s administrative appeal, the ALJ ordered the 
withholding of funds to the District on the effective date of his order, ER6 1148, 
giving TUSD neither criteria it could implement in order to comply nor time to 
comply after issuing its ruling.  
None of the post-enforcement procedures utilized in the present case cured 
the vagueness of the statute. Instead, the manner in which the post-enforcement 
procedures were applied underscores that the statute was enforced against MAS in 
an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The statute’s vague terms allowed 
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Defendants to enforce A.R.S. § 15-112 according to their own “personal 
predilections,” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974), and TUSD, having no 
clarity as to the statute’s meaning and faced with the forfeiture of millions of 
dollars in State funding, ER5 903, had no choice but to deny the MAS program to 
its students.  
IV. PROHIBITION (A)(3) IS NOT SEVERABLE BECAUSE IT CANNOT 
BE ESTABLISHED THAT THE LEGISLATURE WOULD HAVE 
ENACTED THE VALID PORTIONS ABSENT (A)(3). 
 
As set forth in our opening brief, Opening Br. at 58, the Arizona Supreme 
Court has made clear that severability of an unconstitutional statutory provision 
turns on “whether the legislature intended that the act be severable.” Hull v. 
Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634, 639 (Ariz. 1998) (citing State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 
848 P.2d 273, 280 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Pandell, 161 P.3d 557, 530 (Ariz. 2007) 
(“[s]everability is a question of legislative intent”) (quoting State v. Watson. 586 
P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ariz. 1978)). Arizona courts use a two-prong test: “We will sever 
the statutory provision only if we can determine that (1) the valid portions are 
effective and enforceable standing alone and (2) the legislature would have enacted 
the valid portions of the statute absent the invalid provision.” Hull, 960 P.2d at 
639-40 (citing Symington, 848 P.2d at 280) (emphasis added); Opening Br. at 58. 
Defendants’ rule statement for severability is incomplete at best (and 
misleading at worst) because it addresses only the first prong of the test and 
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ignores the second.
22
 Appellees’ Br. at 34-35. Even assuming the first prong of the 
test is satisfied and the remaining portions are grammatically separate and 
theoretically could be enforced independently, Defendants do little to address 
whether “the legislature would have enacted the valid portions of the statute absent 
the invalid provision.” Hull, 960 P.2d at 639 (citing Symington, 848 P.2d at 280).  
 The limited arguments Defendants make with regard to legislative intent do 
not support severance. First, they argue that the remaining portions of the statute 
after severing (A)(3) are enforceable because they are consistent with the general 
goals of the statute. Appellees’ Br. at 36. As discussed above, that is not the 
applicable legal standard. Further, Defendants’ reliance on Symington is misplaced. 
In that case, the legislature enacted a statute seeking the transfer of money from 
various special funds to the general fund to balance the state budget. 848 P.2d at 
275. The court held that, while provisions imposing an alternative minimum tax on 
the State Compensation Fund were unconstitutional, they were severable from 
                                                          
22
 Defendants rely on Randolph v. Groscost, 989 P.2d 751, 754 (Ariz. 1999), to 
suggest that, in determining whether a statute is severable, a court looks only to 
whether the non-offensive terms are grammatically separate and independently 
enforceable. Appellees’ Br. at 34-35. However, that case involved a voter 
proposition, not a legislative enactment, and the court made clear, though, that 
when dealing with a legislative enactment, courts properly look to legislative 
history as a guide. Randolph, 989 P.2d at 755 (citing Hull, 960 Ariz. at 639-40). 
Defendants further state, without citation, that the court’s inquiry into legislative 
intent with regard to severability “begins with” examining only the wording of the 
statute, Appellees’ Br. at 36, an argument that ignores the second part of the Hull 
test. 
Case: 13-15657     06/02/2014          ID: 9117183     DktEntry: 52     Page: 64 of 70
 56 
 
 
parts of the statute requiring transfers from other, wholly different funds. Id. at 
281. While, in that case, the transfers from the other funds were not dependent on 
the transfers from the State Compensation Fund, evidence in the present case 
establishes that (A)(3), which targeted courses “primarily designed for pupils of a 
particular ethnic group,” was a driving motivation for the enactment of A.R.S. § 
15-112.  
Second, while Defendants argue that “the statements of individual legislators 
cannot be imputed to the entire legislature,” Appellees’ Br. at 36 n.18, legislative 
history in the form of statements by the bill sponsor and the bill’s author, as well as 
the direct history of (A)(3) through legislative committees and before the 
legislature, is highly relevant in determining whether the legislature would have 
enacted the statute without the offensive provision.
23
 In the present case, the 
legislative history makes clear that the unconstitutional provision, (A)(3) 
(prohibiting courses or classes that “[a]re designed primarily for pupils of a 
particular ethnic group”), was a driving force behind the statute’s enactment. See 
Opening Br. at 59-61. For example, bill Sponsor Representative Montenegro 
                                                          
23
 Compare N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1986) (sponsor’s 
statements “are an authoritative guide” and were accorded special weight in 
interpreting scope of Title IX) with Mims, 132 S. Ct.at 752 (“views of a single 
legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, are not controlling”). Plaintiffs never argue that 
Montenegro’s statements are controlling, but rather that the bill sponsor’s 
statements are important and part of the broader legislative history that Arizona 
courts look to in making severability determinations. 
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stated: “I do not subscribe to any type of racial separatism or racial division, so this 
is why I have brought this bill forward.” Opening Br. at 11. Even if there is 
uncertainty regarding what weight to give to statements by the bill sponsor, 
Defendants essentially concede that (A)(3) was the impetus of the statute:  
To the extent that an expression of legislative intent by any one person is 
relevant, this Court should consider former Superintendent Horne’s own 
description of the impetus for this statute—that “[p]eople are individuals, not 
exemplars of racial groups” and that “[i]t is fundamentally wrong to divide 
students up according to their racial group” and teach them separately.  
 
Appellees’ Br. at 40 (quoting ER10 2183) (emphasis added). This is further 
corroborated by Horne’s statements to the House Education Committee when he 
stated that the bill was intended “to prohibit grouping students by race.” Opening 
Br. at 12. 
 The full legislative history demonstrates that A.R.S. § 15-112 was enacted to 
prevent Mexican American Studies courses because of the fear that such courses 
would attract Mexican American students who, once they learned history, 
literature, and art that emphasized Mexican American perspectives, might be 
resentful toward other racial groups or identify more strongly as a Mexican 
American. Without (A)(3) which, as the court below noted, could chill the teaching 
of all ethnic studies courses, ER1 19, the feared “segregated” setting would not 
exist for what then-Senator Huppenthal described as the indoctrination of students 
within MAS classes “to have a certain mindset of us versus them.” Opening Br. at 
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11. Legislative history shows that ethnic studies classes for minority students were 
viewed as the setting or predicate for the fostering of resentment and ethnic 
solidarity. Thus, (A)(3) is not severable because the statute was enacted, not to 
simply prohibit teaching materials and concepts that might lead to resentment and 
solidarity, but to prevent the teaching of materials and concepts that might lead to 
resentment and solidarity among ethnic minority students.  
The legislative history make clears that Defendants cannot establish that 
(A)(3) is severable, as the Arizona courts will sever the unconstitutional provision 
“only if we can determine that . . . (2) the legislature would have enacted the valid 
portions of the statute absent the invalid provision.” Hull, 960 P.2d at 640. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs’ Opening 
Brief, the district court’s ruling should be affirmed with respect to the overbreadth 
of A.R.S. 15-112(A)(3), and otherwise reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
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